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Fear conditioning is one of the prime paradigms of behavioural neuroscience and a source of tremendous
insight in the fundamentals of learning and memory and the psychology and neurobiology of emotion. It
is alsowidely regarded as amodel for the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders in a diathesis-stressmodel of
psychopathology. Starting from the apparent paradox between the adaptive nature of fear conditioning
and thedysfunctional nature of pathological anxiety,wepresent a critique of thehuman fear conditioninguman fear conditioning
iathesis-stress
voidance tendencies
elective learning
esponse system divergence
paradigm as an experimentalmodel for psychopathology.We discuss the potential beneﬁts of expanding
the human fear conditioning paradigm by (1) including action tendencies as an important index of fear
and (2) paying more attention to “weak” (i.e., ambiguous) rather than “strong” fear learning situations
(Lissek et al., 2006), such as contained in selective learning procedures. We present preliminary data
that illustrate these ideas and discuss the importance of response systems divergence in understanding
individual differences in vulnerability for the development of pathological anxiety.Pavlovian fear conditioning is amongst themost successful labo-
atory paradigms in the history of experimental psychopathology.
odelled after the appetitive conditioning procedure introduced
y Pavlov (1903/1928, 1927), it entails the repeated pairing of an
nitially neutral stimulus (the conditioned stimulus or CS; say, a
one) with a stimulus that is intrinsically aversive (the uncondi-
ioned stimulus or US; say, an electrocutaneous stimulus). As a
esult, CS presentation typically comes to elicit a variety of reac-
ions indicative of fear. In animals, these responsesmay include the
nterruption of all locomotion and gross body movements during
he presentation of the CS (freezing; e.g., Bouton and Bolles, 1980),
uppression of ongoing instrumental behaviour (the so-called con-
itioned emotional response; Davis, 1990), and ampliﬁcation of the
tartle reﬂex that is elicited by a loud auditory probe (startle poten-
iation; e.g., Brown et al., 1951). In humans, next to physiological
ndices of fear (e.g., an increase in skin conductance during pre-
entation of the CS), some of which parallel indices widely used in
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animals (e.g., potentiation of the eye blink startle reﬂex, measured
through EMG), the experimenter can also assess feelings of appre-
hension upon presentation of the CS, through verbal report (Lipp,
2006).
This basic procedure is an important paradigm for the
behavioural and cognitive (neuro)sciences. Arguably,muchofwhat
we know today about fear, about learning and memory generally,
as well as about fear learning speciﬁcally, is the result of research
that has in some way applied the basic fear conditioning paradigm.
It has proven a tool of great use, not only in uncovering the psy-
chological processes that govern the genesis and expression of fear
and the functioning of emotional and general memory, but also in
exploring the neurobiological underpinnings of emotion and learn-
ing (e.g., see Craske et al., 2006; Fanselowand Poulos, 2005;Hartley
and Phelps, 2010; Lang et al., 2000; LeDoux, 2000).
Ever since the work by Watson (Watson and Morgan, 1917;
Watson and Rayner, 1920), the fear conditioning paradigm is also
widely regarded as a prime tool for the experimental study of psy-
chopathology. The idea here is that fear conditioning provides a
laboratory model for the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders in the
real world (Barlow, 2002; Mineka and Zinbarg, 2006). According
to this view, pathological anxiety for stimuli that are essentially
innocuous (e.g., house spiders or crowded places) may develop
throughpairingwith aversive events or traumatic experiences (e.g.,
a frightened mother or a panic attack); such pairing may be expe-
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.rienced ﬁrst-hand or vicariously. Much like a CS, these originally
innocuous stimuli then come to elicit excessive fear or anxiety
and spur avoidance behaviour through reference to the associated
fearsome event (the analogue of a US).
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The analogy between Pavlovian fear conditioning and the
athogenesis of anxiety disorders has been and continues to
e of tremendous heuristic value, for instance in the develop-
ent of novel techniques to reduce pathological anxiety and to
ounter relapse after successful treatment (e.g., Culver et al., 2011;
ansteenwegen et al., 2006).1 However, its merit in inspiring inno-
ations in clinical practice notwithstanding, there is a remarkable
aradox in the use of the fear conditioning paradigm as a labora-
ory model for the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders, conceptually
s well as empirically.
Conceptually, Pavlovian fear conditioning is in essence a highly
daptive phenomenon that helps to detect warning signals for
mpending threats. If a cue in the environment is likely to be
ollowed by something unpleasant, aversive or potentially life-
hreatening, it is entirely appropriate for anorganism toexhibit fear
n the face of that cue, particularly if that fear helps him steer clear
rom the impending danger (Frijda, 1986). In accordance with the
daptive nature of fear conditioning, in laboratory studies mostly
veryone will learn to exhibit fear upon confrontation with a cue
CS) that reliably predicts the occurrence of an aversive outcome
US); it is a rather robust and reliable phenomenon.
In clear contrast with the adaptive nature of fear conditioning,
athological fear and anxiety are (by deﬁnition) characterized by
ehaviour that is out of measure with the extent of actual danger-
xcessive avoidance, exceedingly high levels of subjective fear
nd anxiety, cognitive preoccupation and the like (Barlow, 2002).
nd in sharp contrast to people’s general susceptibility to fear
onditioning, most people confronted with highly aversive, life-
hreatening or otherwise traumatic situations eventually do not
evelop an anxiety disorder (Mineka and Zinbarg, 2006). Indeed,
p to 95% of people are exposed to one or more traumatic events
n their lives, but only between 10 and 30% of trauma survivors
evelop an anxiety disorder (Engelhard et al., 2008). Clearly, some
actors extraneous to the actual experience itselfmodulate the rela-
ion between trauma and anxiety disorder. Research has actually
nveiled an array of individual difference factors that are predictive
or (and probably causally implicated in) the development of anxi-
ty disorders, ranging from personality traits and dispositions (e.g.,
euroticism, trait anxiety, anxiety sensitivity; Gershuny and Sher,
998; Jorm et al., 2000) over neural indicators (e.g., threat-related
mygdala reactivity; Hariri, 2009) to genetic markers (e.g., poly-
orphisms that affect functioning of the serotonin or dopamine
ystem; Gordon and Hen, 2004; also see Sen et al., 2004). These
ndividual difference factors probably constitute vulnerability fac-
ors for reacting maladaptively to signiﬁcant negative life events in
diathesis-stress model of psychopathology (e.g., Zvolensky et al.,
005).
If such a diathesis-stress model of anxiety disorders is to be rec-
nciled with the idea that fear conditioning plays a crucial role in
heetiologyof thesedisorders, one shouldexpect toﬁnddifferences
n sensitivity or proneness to fear conditioning between more and
ess vulnerable individuals (such differences would in fact repre-
ent amainmechanismofvulnerability). Studies comparingclinical
nd non-clinical populations provide some support for this idea.
or instance, anxiety patients exhibit stronger conditioning to the
S+ than healthy controls in a single-cue conditioning procedure
Lissek et al., 2005). In a differential fear conditioning procedure,
anic disorder patients compared to healthy controls sometimes
1 Note however that Wolpe’s technique of gradual or systematic desensitization
Wolpe, 1969), which laid the grounds for current exposure treatments for anxiety,
as based not so much on an analogy with conditioning (i.e., extinction) but on
he principle of emotional response incompatibility (i.e., you cannot be afraid and
elaxed at the same time). Wolpe did use conditioning procedures to induce fear in
is laboratory cats (Wolpe, 1958).hology 92 (2013) 90–96 91
exhibit elevated responding to the CS that is not paired with the
outcome (the CS−), resulting in impaired discrimination learning
(Lissek et al., 2009). Similarly, panic disorder and post-traumatic
stress disorder patients have been shown to be impaired in the
extinction of conditioned fear relative to normal controls (Blechert
et al., 2007; Michael et al., 2007).
However valuable such studies, they do not allow to decide
whether fear conditioning anomalies represent a true vulnerability
factor (i.e., a diathesis) or a diagnostic marker (a consequence) of
fear pathology. Despite the putative causal role of fear conditioning
in the development of anxiety disorders in a diathesis-stress frame-
work, efforts to relate known vulnerability factors to dysfunctional,
excessive fear learning patterns in non-clinical populations have
met with much more equivocal results, with most studies failing
to ﬁnd a consistent relationship between factors such as neuroti-
cismor introversion and fear acquisition (e.g., Davidson et al., 1964;
Guimaraes et al., 1991;Otto et al., 2007; Pineles et al., 2009) andone
recent study even suggesting that high trait anxiety is associated
with superior discrimination learning (Indovina et al., 2011).
So here is the empirical paradox: In a basic fear conditioning
procedure, people who are at risk for the development of some
form of anxiety disorder do not seem to behave differently from
people who are not, even though fear conditioning is presumed
to be a prime pathogenetic pathway towards the development of
anxiety disorders in the diathesis-stress model of anxiety.
We should immediately qualify the preceding statement, as
there are in fact a few demonstrations of subtle individual differ-
ences in fear conditioning thatmay be relevant to the pathogenesis
of psychopathology. One particularly nice example is a recent
study by Lonsdorf et al. (2009). They performed a basic differ-
ential fear conditioning procedure, in which one cue (a picture
of a human face; CS+) was consistently paired with a mild elec-
trocutaneous shock (US), whereas a second cue (a picture of a
different human face; CS−) was presented without shock. On the
ﬁrst day of the experiment, acquisition training was conducted.
Remarkably, acquisition was obtained only in carriers of the short
version of a polymorphism in the 5-SHHTR gene. This polymor-
phism, located in the serotonin transporter gene, is implicated in
amygdala reactivity and associated with neuroticism, the latter
being a known risk factor for anxiety disorders (Sen et al., 2004).
The second day, extinction training was conducted. In those par-
ticipants who demonstrated acquisition, reliable extinction was
obtained only in a subsample consisting of carriers of a spe-
ciﬁc polymorphism (i.e., val allele carriers) of the gene coding for
catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT). This polymorphism makes
the enzyme degrade dopamine particularly efﬁciently and reduces
activity in the prefrontal cortex and connected activity in hip-
pocampus and amygdala (Bilder et al., 2004). Absence of the val
allele has been associated with negative mood states such as anxi-
ety and depression, as well as with a lack of beneﬁt from exposure
therapy inpanic disorder patients (Lonsdorf et al., 2010). Thesedata
suggest that individual difference factors that predispose for patho-
logical anxiety may indeed modulate fear conditioning processes,
lending some support to a diathesis-stress conditioning model.
Yet, exceptions such as the study just described notwithstand-
ing (and a few other ones, e.g., Baas et al., 2008; Craske et al.,
2008; Grillon and Ameli, 2001), convincing evidence for a strong
link between individual vulnerability factors for anxiety disorders
on the one hand and disordered, excessive fear conditioning pat-
terns on the other hand is surprisingly scarce. There thus appears
to be a conceptual incongruity between the adaptiveness of fear
conditioning and the dysfunctional nature of anxiety pathology
that is reﬂected at least partly in an empirical discrepancy. Peo-
ple who are vulnerable for the development of anxiety disorders,
should, according to a Pavlovian conditioning model of pathogen-
esis, develop conditioned fears more readily or more strongly than
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thers; yet, theydonot seemto.Obviously, this stateof affairs raises
he questionwhether fear conditioning is such a goodmodel for the
athogenesis of anxiety disorders after all. Is fear conditioning per-
aps a valuable tool for investigating adaptive fear learning and
ormal learning and memory processes in general, but not suitable
or the experimental study of dysfunctional fear learning patterns
that is, patterns of fear learning that differentiate between at-risk
nd not-at-risk individuals)?
In the remainder, we will argue that the relative lack of evi-
ence for individual differences in fear conditioning relevant for
nxiety disorders may not be inherently linked to the paradigm
f fear conditioning, but may rather reﬂect limitations of current
rocedures used to induce and measure conditioned fear in the
ab. Speciﬁcally, we will argue for the usefulness (1) of includ-
ng assessment of fearful action tendencies, (2) of assessing fear
sing indirect or automatic rather than (or in addition to) controlled
easures, and (3) of investigating more complex fear conditioning
ituations than single-cue or differential fear conditioning. Along
heway,wewill reﬂect on the relevance of individual differences in
motional response system coherence for human fear conditioning
esearch.
. Fear conditioning research disregards a crucial
omponent of fear
According to emotion theory, emotions like fear are deﬁned by
loosely connected conglomerate of responses in three different
esponse systems, i.e., subjective experience (e.g., a state of appre-
ension), physiological activity (e.g., heart rate acceleration), and
vert behaviour or behavioural impulses (e.g., to avoid), each being
ital to emotional phenomenology (Frijda, 1986; Gross, 2007; Lang,
985; Lang et al., 1998). Moreover, according to dimensional views
n emotion, emotional states are organized around a few funda-
ental dimensions. The most commonly assumed dimensions are
alence (contrasting states of pleasure with states of displeasure),
rousal (sometimes referred to as activation, contrasting states of
ow and high arousal), and approach–avoidance motivation (con-
rasting states characterized by a tendency to engage with states
haracterized by a tendency to withdraw; Mauss and Robinson,
009). Emotional expressions in the different response systems
end to correlateonlyweaklyover individuals andover time (Mauss
t al., 2005). To some extent this lack of correlation simply reﬂects
he less than perfect reliability of our measurements (i.e., simple
easurement error). However, part of the divergence is also due
o the fact that measurement of activity in the three response sys-
ems differently reﬂects the fundamental dimensions that organize
motional states (Mauss and Robinson, 2009). Subjective experi-
nce is particularly sensitive to valence and arousal; physiological
easures used in fear conditioning research are mainly sensitive
o arousal (e.g., skin conductance; Bradley and Lang, 2000) or to
alence, but only at high levels of arousal (e.g., startle potentiation;
ang, 1995). Overt behaviour or action tendencies would mainly
eﬂect the motivational component of emotion. Whilst some emo-
ion theories regard these three components as equally important
onstituents of emotion (Lang, 1985), some even argue that action
endencies constitute the core of emotions, as the ultimate function
f emotion is to exert steering control over behaviour (Frijda, 1986).
n this view, emotions are deﬁned as felt action tendencies or action
ispositions (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lang, 1995). Similarly,
motional disorders are essentially behavioural dysfunctions: A
endency towards avoidance behaviour is one of the diagnostic cri-
eria formany anxiety disorders (American Psychiatric Association,
000), and etiological models assume that the tendency to escape
r avoid threat (whether successfully translated in overt behaviour
r not) elicits, maintains and/or exacerbates phobia (Barlow, 2002;
arks and Nesse, 1994). Studying behavioural tendencies mighthology 92 (2013) 90–96
therefore be of fundamental importance towards understanding
when and how adaptive fear might go awry. Yet human fear con-
ditioning research typically samples either subjective experience
(asking forverbal reportof fearorUSexpectancy), physiology (mea-
suring bodily reactions such as changes in skin conductance or
potentiation of the startle reﬂex), or both. It is typically not con-
cerned with action tendencies elicited by conditioned stimuli. To
its defence, conditioning research as a ﬁeld has recently rediscov-
ered avoidance as an important topic of study (e.g., Declercq and
De Houwer, 2009; Lovibond et al., in press), but mainly as concerns
the operant principles and representational structures that govern
escape and avoidance behaviour. The transfer of avoidance ten-
dencies to initially neutral cues in human fear conditioning, as an
instantiation of fear itself, has so far not been a topic of much inter-
est. We know of only one exception in the literature (Grillon et al.,
2006). In that study, after acquisition participants were allowed to
navigate freely in two out of three virtual contexts that were asso-
ciated with no shocks, predictable shocks, or unpredictable shocks,
respectively. Results indicated that participants had a strong pref-
erence to navigate into the no-shock context and avoid the context
associated with unpredictable shocks. More work along these lines
seems timely.
2. Fear conditioning research often assesses cognitive or
controlled expressions of conditioned fear rather than
automatic or implicit fear expression
The current state of affairs implies that one important com-
ponent of what it means to be fearful (a disposition to avoid) is
not covered in research of conditioned fear. Also, the fact that
verbal/cognitive, behavioural, and physiological response systems
do not always covary in fear learning has long been recognized
(e.g., Hodgson and Rachman, 1974; Mineka, 1979), but implica-
tions of this divergence for the understanding of pathological fear
are never considered. In fact, when in fear conditioning research
multiple indices of fear are included – typically subjective report
and one or more physiological measures – this is usually done for
reasons of cross-validation; divergence between measurements is
often attributed to measurement error (see above). Yet, response
systemdivergence and individual differences thereinmay be infor-
mative for understanding pathological fear. For instance, research
has indicated that there is a subgroup of people with high vigi-
lance for threat who report low levels of subjective distress upon
confrontation with aversive stimuli, whilst at the same time show-
ing elevated levels of physiological arousal (repressors; Derakshan
et al., 2007; Weinberger et al., 1979). More generally, vulnerabil-
ity factors for anxiety disorders such as neuroticism and anxiety
sensitivity are known to be associated with an unwillingness or
inability for accurate subjective report of negative emotions (Barr
et al., 2008; King and Emmons, 1990; Paulhus and Reid, 1991). One
implication is that individual differences in emotionality (e.g., fear)
may be underestimated if one looks merely at cognitive, control-
lable expressions of fear. This presumably holds true especially
for verbal report of subjective anxiety or arousal, but it is well
known that some physiological indices widely used in fear con-
ditioning are rather sensitive to cognitive inﬂuence as well (e.g.,
skin conductance; e.g., Lovibond, 2003; Soeter and Kindt, 2010). It
is thus conceivable that (someof the) peoplewho are vulnerable for
anxiety disorders actually do develop excessive fear in a fear con-
ditioning procedure, but that this excessive fear is not expressed
clearly in many of the indices routinely used in fear condition-
ing research (i.e., subjective report, skin conductance responding),
either because excessive fear is evident most strongly in a dimen-
sion that is not captured by these measures (i.e., the avoidant
action tendency that is a core part of fear; see above) or because
T. Beckers et al. / Biological Psychology 92 (2013) 90–96 93
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2ig. 1. A working model for the role of fear conditioning in the pathogenesis of
xpressions of fear (e.g., avoidance tendencies), particularly when confronted with
he measures used are partly sensitive to concealment.2 As such,
sychological dispositions that predispose for anxiety disorders
e.g., neuroticism) may be associated with increased divergence
etween more and less controlled expressions of fear (e.g., ver-
al report versus indirectmeasures; DeHouwer, 2006), or between
hat people (report to) feel andwhat theydo. If so, in some individ-
als, fear respondingmay be out ofmeasurewith the actual level of
hreat or more resistant to reduction in some response systems or
easures but not in others, resulting for example in excessive fear
esponses in behavioural expression but not in subjective report
see Fig. 1).
Obviously, much of the above is speculation. It does suggest,
owever, that it may be important to include in fear condition-
ng research not only measures that cover all of the fundamental
imensionsof fear (valence, arousal, action tendency) but alsomea-
ures of fear that are relatively indirect andunobtrusive, in addition
o more controlled measures such as verbal report of fear or US
xpectancy. Such measures arguably exist for valence and arousal.
or instance, fear conditioning has been shown to endow CSs with
he capacity to prime categorization responses in an affective prim-
ng task (Hermans et al., 2002). In such a task, clearly positive
nd negative words are presented on screen, and participants are
sked to evaluate these words as quickly as possible. Crucially, the
ords are preceded by a brief presentation of the CS+ or CS− pic-
ure. Reaction time analysis reveals that presentation of the CS+
icture speeds up responding to negative words and slows down
esponding to positive words, relative to the CS− picture, indica-
ive of an evaluative response to the CS pictures. Importantly, such
n affective priming effect is obtained even though CS valence
s irrelevant for the task at hand (making it an indirect measure
f CS valence). Research suggests that the effect is based on the
utomatic processing of the valence of the CSs and that it is not
ependent upon controlled response strategies (Hermans et al.,
002).
2 In relation to the former, note that the study by Lonsdorf et al. (2009) that did
how different fear conditioning patterns in people at risk for anxiety disorders
ade use of potentiation of the startle reﬂex as the index of fear, startle potentiation
rguably being a less cognitive index of fear than verbal report or skin conductance
HammandVaitl, 1996; but see Lipp et al., 2003; Purkis and Lipp, 2001;Mallan et al.,
009).y disorders. Excessive fear learning patterns may emerge more easily in implicit
ak” fear learning situation. See main text for details.
Similarly, startle eye-blink modulation appears to be a rela-
tively uncontrolled index of stimulus valence and arousal, such
that arousing stimuli with a negative valence (such as conditioned
fear stimuli) potentiate the startle reﬂex whereas arousing stim-
uli with a positive valence attenuate the startle reﬂex (Lang et al.,
1990). Research moreover suggests that conditioned stimuli can
elicit startle potentiation in the absence of awareness of the CS–US
relationship (Hamm and Vaitl, 1996), suggesting that like affec-
tive priming, startle potentiation can be considered a relatively
uncontrolled measure of fear-conditioned stimulus valence (plus
arousal). However, both the selective sensitivity of startle poten-
tiation to negative stimulus valence and the possibility of startle
potentiation in the absence of contingency awareness are subject
to debate (e.g., Lipp et al., 2003; Purkis and Lipp, 2001).
To supplement such indirect measures with an index that cap-
tures speciﬁcally the approach–avoidance dimension of fear, we
have recently developed a procedure to capture action tendencies
induced by fear conditioning. We built on previous work, in which
we showed that appetitive conditioning of a CS (i.e., pairing of an
initially neutral tray with chocolate consumption) results in the CS
eliciting an automatic approach tendency (Van Gucht et al., 2008).
After repeatedly pairing the CS+ tray with chocolate consumption
(and a CS− tray with no chocolate consumption), participants
were presented with pictures of the CS+ or CS− tray on a computer
screen. Also on the screen on every trial was a manikin that partic-
ipants had to move towards or away from the picture as quickly as
possible, dependingonCS identity. Reaction timedata revealed that
participants were signiﬁcantly faster to make the manikin move
towards CS+ pictures and away from CS− pictures than vice versa,
which indicates that the CS+ picture elicited an automatic ten-
dency to approach that facilitatedmoving themanikin towards the
picture and interferedwithmoving themanikin away from the pic-
tures (relative to theCS−baseline reaction timespeed).Werecently
modiﬁed this procedure in our lab to measure avoidance tenden-
cies towards conditioned fear stimuli. In that procedure, different
pictures of one geometrical object (e.g., a cube; CS+) are paired
with shock, whereas pictures of a different object (e.g., a cylinder;
CS−) are not paired with shock. Afterwards, the pictures are again
presented one by one, accompanied by a manikin; participants
are instructed to make the manikin move towards or away from
the pictures as quickly as possible, based on the orientation of the
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icture. Preliminary results suggest that participants are reliably
aster to make the manikin move away from CS+ pictures and
owards CS− pictures than vice versa, indicative of a tendency to
ithdraw from a conditioned fear stimulus (and/or to approach
conditioned safety stimulus, the CS−). Note that the CS pic-
ures elicit that tendency despite the identity of the CS (CS+ or
S− picture) not being relevant for the task (Krypotos et al., in
reparation).
Thework just describedprovidesmerely aproof of principle that
ear conditioning results in a conditioned avoidance tendency that
an be captured indirectly in a speeded reaction time task. Future
ork will have to point out whether that conditioned avoidance
endency is particularly sensitive to individual difference variables
hat are known to be related to disordered anxiety, as hypothesized
e.g., is increased in people with high trait anxiety, more resistant
o extinction, or generalizes more broadly).
. Fear conditioning research samples learning situations
hat are overly simple and unambiguous
As argued above, basic fear conditioning is essentially an
daptive phenomenon through which an organism learns to
nticipate impending threat. Thus, in its simplest form (a CS that
s consistently followed by an aversive US), the fear conditioning
ask represents a “strong situation” (Lissek et al., 2006). A strong
ituation is one in which the stimuli that are encountered by an
ndividual are unambiguous and predict or constitute a clear hedo-
istic event. In a strong situation, individuals typically all reactwith
imilar, adaptive response patterns. So, applied to the basic fear
onditioning procedure, one may expect that the unambiguous
hreat of an imminent and dangerous stimulus following the CS+
ill result in an adaptive fear response to the CS+ that will exhibit
imited variability across individuals. Lissek et al. (2006) argue
hat “weak situations” (situations characterized by ambiguity or
ncertainty) provide much more opportunity to reveal meaningful
ifferences in the psychobiology of fear and anxiety (such as
ifferences in fear learning patterns) between patient populations
nd healthy controls. The same arguably holds for revealing
ifferences within non-clinical populations between individuals
ith low versus high vulnerability for the development of anxiety
athology. Therefore, evenwhen armouredwith indirectmeasures
f fear that are able to capture the avoidance dimension of fear, it is
resumablywise to focus on situations that are not overly simple or
nambiguous when the aim is to reveal fear learning patterns that
ay be implicated in the development of anxiety disorders, but to
esign situations that involve a certain degree of complexity, ambi-
uity and/or uncertainty. These kinds of situations are abundant in
aily life. Indeed, stimuli are typically embedded in a constellation
f other discrete stimuli. For instance, the experience of an aversive
r traumatic event is typically not accompanied or preceded by a
ingle, clearly predictive signal but surrounded by a variety of cues
ith different degrees of predictiveness and salience. Under such
ircumstances, the relation of any one cue in the environment to
he traumatic event is clearly ambiguous and various cues can
nter into competition for fear-elicitation (i.e., some stimuli can
ome to elicit fear whereas others do not). One way to model
uch a situation in the lab is through cue competition or selective
earning procedures (Fanselow, 1998; Miller and Matute, 1996).
n example is a blocking procedure, in which a single CS A (say,
tone) is ﬁrst paired with a US (e.g., a shock), after which a
imultaneous compound of stimulus A and a second stimulus B
say, a ﬂashing light) is also paired with shock. In a normal sample,
his procedure may result in high levels of conditioned responding
fear) to A but relatively weak levels of conditioned responding to
, notwithstanding the fact that B has repeatedly been followed
y a US (e.g., Lipp et al., 2001). Such blocking of the acquisitionhology 92 (2013) 90–96
of fear to B has been argued to be highly adaptive, because it
implies that an organism learns to fear only those stimuli that are
non-redundant predictors of aversive events whilst disregarding
redundant ones (Kamin, 1969). However, in reality, the status
of B in a blocking procedure is somewhat ambiguous, given that
subjects have never experienced the effect of B in itself; if B in itself
were also predictive of shock, it would still follow that the joint
presentation of A and B could be logically expected to be followed
by shock. The fact that blocking relies on an inference about an
inherently ambiguous situation is illustrated by the fact that in a
normal population, blocking is not always readily obtained (Lipp
et al., 2001; Mitchell and Lovibond, 2002); the degree of blocking
can be modulated by presenting participants with information
that helps resolve the ambiguous nature of the AB compound
trials (by informing participants that a compound of two cues that
are each individually followed by shock should lead to a stronger
shock; Mitchell and Lovibond, 2002; see also Beckers et al.,
2006).
Obviously, the ambiguity of a selective learning procedure like
blocking constitutes an excellent example of a weak situation.
Selectivity in inferences aboutdangerwould indeed seemadaptive;
a failure to resolve the ambiguity in a selectiveway (i.e., a tendency
to treat all cues that are followedby shockas threat signals, even the
redundant ones, and respond to all such cues with fear) would lead
to a considerable increase in the number of danger signals in the
environment. Such a better-safe-than-sorry strategy would imply
that fear and avoidance are provoked by an excessive range of stim-
uli, including those for which such reactions are not warranted. A
recent reanalysis of a few cue competition experiments in our lab
provides some evidence that one known vulnerability factor for the
development of pathological anxiety, trait anxiety, is indeed associ-
ated with a deﬁcit in selective fear learning (Boddez et al., 2012). In
these experiments, all participants were presented with a blocking
contingency in which one geometrical ﬁgure (CS A) was repeatedly
paired with shock, after which a compound of that geometrical ﬁg-
ure with another ﬁgure (CS B) was also paired with shock (A+ then
AB+ training). These trials were embedded in a number of ﬁller and
control trials. At the ﬁnal test, participants rated their expectancy
of shock for a number of stimuli contained in the experiment,
includingA andB. Correlational andmedian-split analyses revealed
that the degree of selectivity in fear learning (operationalized here
as the level of US expectancy for B) was signiﬁcantly modulated
by participants’ level of trait anxiety as indexed by the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983). Importantly, trait anxiety
did not correlate with fear learning for A or any of the other
cues included in the design, suggesting that trait anxiety did not
affect fear learning per se but speciﬁcally the selectivity of fear
learning.
Again, these data provide littlemore than initial evidence for the
idea that a lack of selective fear learning in situations of ambiguity
may be implicated in the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders. They
do suggest that it may be worthwhile to turn to situations that do
more justice to the complexity of real-life situationswhen trying to
unravel whether and how at-risk individuals exhibit dysfunctional
fear learning patterns. Such situations do not have to be limited
to initial fear learning; selective learning or a lack thereof may also
have an impact onefforts to reduce fear throughextinctionor expo-
sure procedures. Suppose that in a blocking-type procedure, one
ﬁrst learns to selectively fear stimulus A (the blocking stimulus) but
not stimulus B (the blocked stimulus). From fear conditioning stud-
ies in animals (Blaisdell et al., 1999) and causal learning studies in
humans (Boddez et al., 2011), it appears that subsequent extinction
training of Amayunlock the previously blocked fear for B (although
no research has yet demonstrated this effect in human fear learn-
ing). Such a fear relocation situation may again represent a prime
opportunity for individual differences; perhaps at-risk individuals
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ould be particularly likely to reconsider the inferred safety of B
to the extent that they inferred safety to begin with; see above).3
Obviously, a lack of selectivity of fear learning may not be
qually prominent in all response systems; arguably, indices of fear
hat are highly sensitive to voluntary control can be considered
articularly prone to overgeneral or non-selective fear learning.
gain this implies that individuals at risk for developing patholog-
cal anxiety would be characterized by increased response system
ivergence in selective learning situations, relative to low risk indi-
iduals (see Fig. 1).
. Conclusion
There appears to be a tension between the adaptive nature of
ear conditioning and the dysfunctional nature of anxiety disor-
ers. Still, we have argued that the fear conditioning paradigm can
e retained as a tool for the experimental study of the pathogenesis
f anxiety disorders, provided we work with a richer conceptual-
zation of fear conditioning than is usually done. This entails that
e carefully design situations in the laboratory with a potential for
xcessive fear learning patterns to emerge (so-called “weak situa-
ions”; Lissek et al., 2006) and pay attention to divergence between
esponse systems in these learning situations, particularlyminding
utomatic conditioned responses such as conditioned avoidance
endencies. We have begun work along these lines to investigate
hether individuals differences in fear learning patterns can be
btained that are relevant for the understanding of the pathogene-
is of anxiety disorders. We are hopeful that this work will serve to
onsolidate the diathesis-stress conditioningmodel of pathological
nxiety.
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